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Water as Weapon: 
IS on the Euphrates and Tigris 
The Systematic Instrumentalisation of Water Entails Conflicting IS Objectives 
Tobias von Lossow 
In the course of its territorial expansion, Islamic State (IS, ISIL or ISIS) has brought 
under its control strategically significant water resources and large parts of the water 
infrastructure in Syria and Iraq. It has seized several important dams on the Euphrates 
and Tigris as part of its expansion strategy and, particularly since 2014, has used water 
as a weapon in a number of ways. This practice has disastrous consequences, and it is 
virtually impossible for external actors to prevent it. And yet, even IS’s room for ma-
noeuvre is limited since a functioning water and electricity supply in the areas that it 
has captured is of existential importance for the militia. However, the anti-IS coalition’s 
intensified military interventions since the Paris attacks put the militia under severe 
pressure. Should IS be forced into extensive withdrawals, then whole regions will be at 
risk of dramatic and widespread flooding. 
 
Ever since IS first gained control over im-
portant water resources in Syria and Iraq, it 
has been using water to further its military 
and political aims. Capturing large dams 
and reservoirs on the Euphrates and Tigris 
is a crucial part of IS’s expansion strategy, 
along with seizing oil fields, because it 
enables IS to control the region’s most im-
portant water resources (see map, p. 3, and 
overview, p. 5). The heavy fighting it has 
engaged in over individual dams, and the 
heavy casualties it has incurred, demon-
strate the significance of these facilities 
for IS. 
Almost the entire Syrian part of the 
Euphrates basin is in the IS sphere of influ-
ence. Syrian rebels, joining IS in the course 
of the conflict, conquered all of the coun-
try’s major dams from late 2012 on: the Tish-
rin Dam, Euphrates Dam and Baath Dam. 
From 2014 on, IS expanded its control over 
the Iraqi areas of the upper reaches of the 
Euphrates and Tigris with its lightning-
quick advances in Iraq. Within about a year, 
IS had occupied all strategically significant 
dams there, with the exception of the Hadi-
tha Dam. It has been unable to keep control 
of all of these facilities. However, several 
major dams are still in the militia’s hands, 
including those at Falluja and Ramadi. 
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IS and water as weapon 
For tactical and strategic reasons, water 
frequently plays a significant role in violent 
conflicts and wars. Sensitive components of 
the water infrastructure, such as treatment 
plants, piping systems, pumping stations 
or reservoirs can become targets for mili-
tary violence and be destroyed. However, 
the use of water as a weapon – in the sense 
of military tool – is much more complex 
and primarily serves to put pressure on the 
population and the opponents’ political 
leadership. Drastic interventions in water 
and electricity supplies are meant to break 
resistance and gain the support of the popu-
lation by force, or else drive it out. The aim 
can also be to destroy agriculture and food 
production, and render whole areas unin-
habitable. The strategic dimension of water 
in conflict situations is most evident with 
rivers because control over the resources in 
the upper reaches makes it possible to gain 
influence over, or inflict targeted damage 
on, larger and more distant areas, without 
necessarily directly attacking, occupying or 
controlling them militarily. 
There are essentially three ways of using 
water resources as a weapon: by making 
sure that too little water is available, or too 
much, or water of insufficient quality. IS has 
repeatedly used all three variants and has 
had an impact at the local, regional and 
national level. 
Too little water: Targeted water and elec-
tricity shortages can be created in certain 
areas, or existing supply problems exacer-
bated, if pipes and cables are cut, or if 
water supplies are kept back, withdrawn 
or diverted at a dam. Whoever has control 
over a dam can cause downright droughts 
over large swathes of land downstream. In 
Syria as well as Iraq, IS has time and again 
cut off water and electricity supplies to 
individual districts, towns or whole prov-
inces. For instance, Qaraqosh, a town in 
northern Iraq with a predominantly Chris-
tian population, was completely isolated in 
June 2014, with an IS embargo additionally 
interrupting trade connections to the out-
side world. After seizing the Ramadi Dam 
in May 2015, IS intermittently reduced the 
outflow of the Euphrates by up to 50 per-
cent by diverting water into Lake Habba-
niya. It thus gained control over water sup-
plies for the governorates of Babil, Karbala, 
Najaf and Qadisiya, and drastically limited 
the supply to Anbar Province. 
After capturing the large dams at Falluja, 
Mosul, Samarra and Ramadi, IS not only 
interrupted local water supplies but also 
deprived distant Shiite areas in the lower 
reaches of the Euphrates and Tigris of water 
by damming and diverting it. In order to 
achieve this repeatedly stated goal of IS, 
water from the Euphrates was additionally 
diverted upstream in Syria. This meant, at 
the same time, that IS also struck at one of 
Iraq’s most important agricultural centre. 
Too much water: Whoever has control over 
water can also flood areas – either upstream 
of a dam, by damming and diverting the 
water, or downstream, by releasing large 
volumes of water at once. In April 2014, after 
IS had the Falluja Dam floodgates closed, 
the retained water flooded large areas up-
stream and submerged Iraqi government 
facilities on the banks. The water was 
diverted over an irrigation channel into a 
side valley, inundated extensive areas up 
to 100 km away, and put the town of Abu 
Ghraib under up to 4 metres of water. Be-
tween Falluja and Abu Ghraib over 10,000 
houses and around 200 square kilometres 
of fertile farmland were destroyed; almost 
the entire harvest was wiped out; and live-
stock was killed. Up to 60,000 locals who 
had lost their livelihood in the flood were 
displaced. 
Insufficient quality: Finally, water can be 
used as a weapon by soiling or poisoning 
water resources. This practice can relatively 
easily be “exported” to other regions since 
an attack of this kind causes great damage 
with comparatively simple means. In Decem-
ber 2014, IS deliberately contaminated 
drinking water with crude oil in the Balad 
district of Salahaddin Governorate, south 
of Tikrit. There were also reports of poisoned 
water supplies from Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, 
Raqqa and Baghdad. In one of its video mes- 
SWP Comments 3 
January 2016 
3 
Map 
IS and the Euphrates and Tigris Dams 
 
sages, IS called on its followers to poison 
the drinking water of its enemies elsewhere 
as well. In July 2015, IS members acted on 
this appeal even on European soil. An attack 
on the water supply in Pristina, which was 
only prevented just before execution, was 
intended to contaminate the largest water 
reservoir uphill of the city. 
Tactical uses for the military 
At the same time, water as an instrument of 
war has direct tactical uses for the military. 
Water can be instrumentalised both defen-
sively and, as part of plans to expand or 
attack, offensively. For example, in autumn 
1914, during the First World War, Belgium 
opened locks on rivers, canals and – at high 
tide – even towards the sea near Nieuw-
poort so as to flood the contested Yser plain. 
This succeeded in driving back the German 
units advancing to the Atlantic coast. In 
the Second Sino-Japanese War, by contrast, 
a 1938 attempt by the Chinese leadership 
failed dramatically to drive the steadily 
advancing Japanese army into the waves 
of the Yellow River by breaching a dam in 
Henan Province. Whilst the Japanese sol-
diers largely managed to escape, the flood 
wave forged its way unimpeded to the sea, 
causing up to 800,000 civilian casualties. 
As these examples show, areas are often 
flooded defensively, to stop advancing 
enemy forces. Such an act can also be used 
for offensively, to attack enemy positions. 
Initially IS retained water behind the Falluja 
Dam, thus driving off the Iraqi troops on 
the reservoir banks upstream of the dam. 
By releasing the dammed water two days 
later, IS prevented a rapid advance onto 
its own positions by follow-on units of the 
Iraqi army. In Diyala Governorate, too, the 
militia repeatedly flooded villages to foil 
Iraqi troop advances. 
Partially or totally depriving contested 
areas of water can reduce the water sup-
plies of enemy troops. This simultaneously 
increases the range of movement of one’s 
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own fighters. It also suspends the specific 
function of rivers as natural borders and 
cancels the strategic importance of bridges: 
a few days after the Ramadi Dam floodgates 
had been closed, IS units on the northern 
side of the river were able to cross down-
stream of the dam at low water levels and 
attack the Iraqi troops controlling the 
southern bank. 
A powerful threat 
Regardless of whether, how and to what 
extent water is actually deployed as a 
weapon, the very question of who controls 
this vital resource has a strong psychologi-
cal impact. This is especially true for arid 
regions such as the Middle East, which has 
just suffered its greatest drought in 60 years. 
Moreover, extensive parts of the dilapidated 
Syrian and Iraqi water infrastructure have 
largely collapsed following delayed mod-
ernisation measures, violent conflicts and 
targeted destruction – about half of the 
Syrian infrastructure since the outbreak of 
the civil war. At the same time, the majority 
of the population depends on agriculture 
and relies on irrigation for its fields, espe-
cially in the summer months. 
Critical water resources being in the 
hands of a radical and brutal militia that 
seems capable of anything is a frightening 
idea not just against this particular back-
drop. Moreover, the strategic reach of water 
as a weapon makes it possible to keep threat 
levels high in the long term without actually 
deploying the weapon – a logic similar 
to that of the atom bomb. As long as IS is 
in command of important dams on the 
Euphrates and Tigris, and thus controls 
water distribution over large swathes of the 
country, it has the potential to inflict great 
damage. And whenever water is actually 
deployed as a weapon, the damage caused 
is long-lasting because destroyed pipes, 
ruined harvests or contaminated water 
resources will continue to have an impact 
even if IS is forced back militarily. Addition-
ally, the consequences of such a deployment 
are virtually impossible to calculate since 
the damage caused by extensive flooding 
cannot be limited either in its intensity or 
in its geographical spread. 
It was IS’s temporary capture of the 
Mosul Dam in August 2014, in particular, 
that set off alarm bells around the world. 
After all, around 45 percent of the Iraqi 
electricity supply and the bulk of the water 
supply to the Kurdish regions depend on 
this dam, the largest in the country. The 
concern was that IS might use the country’s 
largest reservoir to let Shiite southeastern 
Iraq, a key agricultural region, dry out 
rapidly. The feared worst-case scenario was 
that IS might blow up the dam – a highly 
sensitive and fragile construction in any 
case – or let it burst. A flood wave about 20 
metres high would then to all intents and 
purposes have wiped out the city of Mosul, 
before travelling on at a speed of 3.5 metres 
per second and hitting Baghdad, 200 kilo-
metres downstream, with a wave height of 
five metres. Total casualties in this scenario 
were estimated at 500,000. However, a few 
days later, IS lost control over the Mosul 
Dam to Iraqi security forces and Kurdish 
Peshmerga fighters, with US close air sup-
port. 
In the meantime, an existential threat 
had arisen in connection with the Haditha 
Dam. Nearly all of Baghdad’s water supply 
and around three-quarters of Iraq’s electric-
ity derive from these two dams. Supported 
by US air attacks, Iraqi forces did manage 
to hold the Haditha Dam, the country’s 
second largest, but IS continues its push to 
capture it. It has besieged the dam for 18 
months and has repeatedly subjected it to 
heavy offensives and series of suicide attacks. 
Limited scope for intervention 
The United Nations (UN) has been observing 
with concern the increasing use of water 
as a weapon of war in conflicts around the 
world, including Syria and Iraq. It has re-
peatedly and severely condemned IS’s prac-
tice, referring to the human right to water. 
However, the international community’s 
ability to intercede is limited, and largely  
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Overview 
Important dams on the Euphrates and Tigris, starting upstream (author’s own table) 
Name/location Primary use/significance ISIS- or  
IS-controlled 
Currently 
controlled by 
Dams in Syria    
Tishrin Dam near Manbij 
(Euphrates) 
 hydropower: max. capacity 630 megawatt (MW) 11/2012–
12/2015 
Kurds/Syrian 
opposition 
Euphrates Dam near Tabqa /  
Tabqa Dam with Lake Assad 
(Euphrates) 
 hydropower: max. capacity 824 MW; irrigation 
 reservoir: Lake Assad, volume is 11.7 km³ at about 2/3 
full 
 supply: largest dam in Syria; supplies approx. 5 mio. 
people with water, and Aleppo and other towns with 
electricity 
since 2/2013 IS 
Baath Dam at Raqqa 
(Euphrates) 
 hydropower: max. capacity 81 MW 
 supply: 60% of Syria’s water supply 
since 2/2013 IS 
Dams on the Iraqi upper reaches   
Dam at Mosul  
(formerly Saddam Dam) 
(Tigris) 
 hydropower: max. capacity 1050 MW; offsets 
fluctuations in water levels; flood protection 
 reservoir: volume is 12 km³ at about 2/3 full 
 supply: largest dam in Iraq; 45% of Iraqi electricity 
supply 
7–16/8/2014 Peshmerga/ 
Kurds 
Dam at Haditha 
(Euphrates) 
 hydropower: max. capacity 660 MW 
 supply: 30% of Iraqi electricity supply; together with 
Mosul Dam, provides almost all of Baghdad’s water 
and electricity  
--- Iraqi troops 
Dam at Samarra, 
Tharthar Dam (Tigris) 
 hydropower: max. capacity 84 MW; irrigation; flood 
protection 
 supply: controls Baghdad’s water supply, canal to 
Lake Tharthar  
4/2014–
autumn 2015 
Iraqi troops 
Dam at Ramadi 
(Euphrates) 
 irrigation; flood protection 
 canal to Lake Habbaniya; connected to Samarra Dam 
by Tharthar Canal 
since 5/2015 IS 
Dam at Falluja, Nuaimiya-
Dam (Euphrates) 
 irrigation; offsets fluctuations in water levels since 4/2014 IS 
 
 
ineffective except for military interven-
tions. It is basically reduced to verifying 
information and accusations. Indeed, the 
use of water as a weapon and interference 
with a state’s vital water supply do repre-
sent a clear violation of international law, 
which is why the UN Security Council (SC) 
might be able to concern itself with water 
for the first time in its history. However, 
the measures that the SC usually applies 
fail with IS: being ostracised by the com-
munity of states, appeals or sanctions have 
no traction with IS. In any case, the highest 
level of escalation, namely a military inter-
vention, has already been reached, albeit 
outside the UN framework. 
This military intervention by the US-led 
anti-IS coalition has been effective on the 
water issue when nothing else has, prevent-
ing IS from gaining control over all impor-
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tant dams on the Iraqi upper reaches of 
the Euphrates and Tigris. In particular, the 
air strikes carried out by the US have been 
aimed repeatedly – and, in certain phases 
on a daily basis – at supporting the Iraqi 
army or Kurdish units in defending dams, 
as was the case for instance with the Hadi-
tha Dam in September 2014 and July 2015. 
Equally, when recapturing the Mosul Dam 
in August 2014, the Iraqi and Kurdish units 
received massive and decisive close air sup-
port from the US President Barack Obama 
justified this operation with the catastrophic 
consequences that a breach of the Mosul 
Dam would have. He thus accounted for the 
de-facto expansion of the original US man-
date, which merely provided for protecting 
minorities. IS positions near the Ramadi 
Dam have also been bombed repeatedly 
since July 2015. Air strikes have been fur-
ther intensified in autumn 2015 and anti-
IS forces that retook the city of Ramadi in 
December are currently close to liberating 
the dam from IS. 
The importance of water for IS 
Even though the possibilities for exerting 
external influence on IS are limited, the 
militia’s use of the water supply is none-
theless subject to a number of constraints. 
In the first instance, IS uses water resources 
and hydropower to supply fellow fighters and 
the population of the areas it has conquered – 
as well as its own base of operations. That 
is why, after capturing the Syrian dams, it 
kept them operating. At the Euphrates Dam 
in Tabqa, electricity production was even 
markedly increased at first so as to supply 
the population of neighbouring regions for 
several hours a day, including the town of 
Raqqa where IS has its command centre. 
Besides, large quantities of water are needed 
for extracting and processing crude oil, sales 
of which continue to provide the militia 
with its financial basis. Even though rev-
enues dropped for some months, IS earns up 
to 40 million US dollars a month from oil. 
Additionally, in areas which had previous-
ly been cut off from water and electricity 
supplies to a great extent, IS is able to recruit 
new followers – mostly because over the past 
decade those in power in Syria and Iraq 
have failed to construct a nationwide basic 
supply of water and electricity. IS thus fills 
a void in regions that had been deliberately 
undersupplied or largely left to their own 
devices. After capturing the city of Mosul in 
June 2014, IS initially cut off water and elec-
tricity supplies. When it resumed supplying 
after a few days, many of those who had fled 
returned for precisely that reason. Under 
these conditions, parts of the Sunni popu-
lation in particular increasingly perceived 
the IS occupation as a liberation. 
Ensuring a basic supply of water and 
electricity also serves IS’s higher purpose 
in the region: to establish a caliphate that pro-
vides public services. Only if IS is capable 
of offering a water supply to the local popu-
lation in a region that has been groaning 
under droughts, shortages and dilapidated 
piping systems for decades, might it be able 
to hold the territories it has conquered, 
secure and legitimise its power, and consoli-
date the proclaimed caliphate. To underpin 
this long-term aim structurally, the milita 
now uses experts to manage the captured 
water resources, and carries out occasional 
repairs to the water infrastructure. 
Besides increasing support for IS among 
the population, providing water and elec-
tricity also has a more immediate merit: it 
is a source of financial revenue. After supplies 
had been halted, certain districts and vil-
lages were offered a resumption of water 
and electricity against payment. In Raqqa, 
for instance, business people have to pay 
water and electricity rates. In Deir ez-Zor 
and surroundings almost four percent of IS 
revenues are generated by electricity rates. 
However, any lasting use of water re-
sources creates a problem for IS. It might 
control dams and electricity production, 
but it does not have the capacities or exper-
tise for professionally operating these com-
plex facilities or for permanently managing 
the hydrological systems. For example, when 
operating a dam the amount of rainfall, 
the flow rate and the interaction of surface 
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waters and groundwater systems have to be 
taken into account. The rapid drop of water 
levels due to the increased electricity gen-
eration at the Euphrates Dam showed IS its 
limits. Within a few days, the level of Lake 
Assad dropped by six metres. As a result, 
several water pumping stations supplying 
Aleppo, among other places, were put out 
of use. Groundwater levels in the surround-
ing area dropped too, forcing IS to ration 
the additional electricity produced for 
Raqqa. At the Falluja and Ramadi Dams in-
dividual floodgates had to be opened time 
and again because the water intermittently 
threatened IS positions and areas it had al-
ready captured. Because IS lacks the neces-
sary expertise, it has occasionally taken on 
the specialists already in the post, who in 
some cases continue to receive their usual 
salaries from the Syrian or Iraqi govern-
ment. 
Between terror and state-building 
The use of water as a weapon in violent 
conflicts is nothing new. In the past, the 
region’s scarce resources were repeatedly 
instrumentalised under Bashar al-Assad 
in Syria and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, who 
used water supplies to put pressure on 
specific regions or population groups and 
deliberately disadvantage them. For in-
stance, in the 1990s Saddam Hussein had 
the marshes in the south of the country 
drained to punish locals there for an up-
rising against his regime. 
Equally, in the current conflict in Syria, 
all parties are using water as a weapon. 
Aleppo, for example, has been cut off from 
water and electricity supplies several times: 
by various rebel groups, IS and the govern-
ment, depending on which party happened 
to be attacking the city. Even the Iraqi gov-
ernment deploys water against IS, accept-
ing dramatic consequences. When IS was 
retaining water at the Falluja Dam, the Iraqi 
government openened the gates of the 
Haditha Dam upstream to put increased 
pressure on IS in Falluja – thus contribut-
ing to the flooding there as well. 
Nevertheless, IS has raised the strategic 
deployment of water as a weapon to new 
heights by making targeted, systematic, 
consistent and at the same time flexible 
use of it. Its approach at the Falluja Dam 
in April 2014 (see above, pp. 2 and 3) is an 
exemplary demonstration of IS’s military 
use of water for defensive as well as offen-
sive purposes, in a number of different 
ways within a matter of days, which exac-
erbated the region’s existing water supply 
crisis and caused substantial damage. 
Simultaneously – and in keeping with 
the image it has of itself – IS is just as inter-
ested in taking over state functions and 
thus in a sustainable use of resources. IS 
therefore has conflicting objectives, which 
make strikingly clear that the organisation 
views itself both as a jihadist terrorist organi-
sation and as a state-like entity. On the one 
hand, it demonstrates short-term strength 
and power, and spreads fear and terror, by 
drying out or flooding swathes of land and 
depriving individual areas of their liveli-
hood by disrupting water, electricity and 
food supplies. On the other hand, its mas-
sive interference in the water infrastructure 
and supply also hits potential supporters 
of IS in the civilian population – unlike 
blowing up World Heritage Sites. Above all, 
in the long run such interference reduces 
IS’s credibility and legitimacy in its own 
ranks. As long as IS exists as a state-like 
entity with a territory that it controls, the 
feared worst-case scenario of a symbolic dam 
explosion is not a strategic option for IS. 
Such a manoeuvre would, after all, thwart 
the further development and consolidation 
of the caliphate. Accordingly, in addressing 
the water issue over the past few months, 
IS has increasingly backed state-building 
measures and has had pipes repaired, water 
tanks built and wells drilled – primarily 
in Syria. In other words, at the moment 
the region’s water resources mostly serve 
to make plausible a transformation of the 
jihadi militia into a quasi-state. 
However, the intensified interventions 
of the international anti-IS coalition since 
the Paris attacks put IS under great pressure. 
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Should IS be militarily decisively pushed 
back and existentially weakened, then the 
threat represented by the masses of water 
behind the dams would rise markedly, espe-
cially in Iraq. If IS loses large swathes of 
its territory, and thus also the populations 
there, then it runs the risk of failing to con-
solidate the caliphate. In keeping with its 
ideology, IS would at that point believe 
itself to be on the threshold of apocalypse, 
engaged in a final battle with its enemies. 
In such an event, the worst-case scenario 
of a Euphrates or Tigris dam being blown 
up, or all floodgates being opened, would 
apply, with consequences both dramatic 
and virtually impossible to calculate – the 
proverbial sinking of the regions concerned. 
If IS is driven back towards its Syrian heart-
land, there is a very real danger that it will 
cause widespread floods before the fiercely 
embattled dams fall to its enemies, as a last 
display of power. Ultimately, the risk of IS 
deploying water as a weapon in its most 
devastating form in Syria and Iraq grows 
if and when the militia is subjected to mas-
sive attacks and forced to withdraw from 
large areas. 
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